

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in the foregoing chapters to make a coherent and comprehensive study of the role played by Jinnah in the creation of Pakistan. The spectre of his 'Two-Nation Theory' is still haunting and tormenting the subcontinent of India. However, different explanations with regard to the partition of the country have been given. A number of scholars have held the leadership of the Indian National Congress responsible for it. There are some who blame the separatist policy of the All India Muslim League, while a section of people find fault with the Hindu majority for the catastrophe of the partition. There is also a near unanimity of the view that the British policy of 'divide and rule' was the cause of the partition of India. No doubt, these and several other factors contributed to the vivisection of India; but what actually proved the most vital force behind the creation of Pakistan was Jinnah's tremendous leadership, which turned the Indian Muslims into a powerful, solid organisation, thus leading them successfully to secure a separate nation for themselves.

Some of the leaders and intellectuals are of the view that if the Britishers had evolved a true federal structure in India before World War II through the Act of 1935, then the

division of the country might have been averted. Apropos of this, Lord Halifax, who was the Viceroy of India from April 3, 1926 to April 18, 1931, stated :

As a matter historical record, when one looks back over the last few years it is surprising how late in the story it was that partition emerged as a practical and pressing political proposition, and the fact that it was never seriously put forward in the Round Table Conference debates,... or indeed in any of the discussions between 1930 and 1940, suggests that Federation, if only it could have been quickly implemented, might have saved the situation.<sup>1</sup>

One cannot agree with this proposition, for why would the Britishers have saved the situation when it was not in their interest? They started ruling over India with the simple device of 'divide and rule' after the War of Independence, and this led to the growing schism between the Hindus and the Muslims since the inception of Victoria Raj, the Bengal partition of 1905, Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 based on separate representation, the communal award, etc., upto the Act of 1935.

Maulana Azad and many others felt that if the Cabinet Mission Plan had been faithfully accepted by the Congress

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1 Lord Halifax, Fulness of Days (London, 1957), p.87.

and the League, the history might have been different. The liberal leader, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, deplored that the Congress-League agreement with regard to the partition of India was not the result of mutual goodwill and understanding. The Cabinet Mission scheme, according to him, was smashed by the 'wobbling and vacillating attitude' of the Congress leaders. He added : "The cherished boon of a United India had fallen into their lap, but they by their own want of political wisdom threw it out and made it beyond their reach."<sup>1</sup> The British were to be blamed for not firmly standing by their own proposals. The Muslim League thought that the Cabinet Mission Plan would be a stepping stone to an independent Pakistan. On June 5, in the Muslim League Council Jinnah declared :

Let me tell you that Muslim India will not rest content until we have established full, complete and sovereign Pakistan.... The Lahore resolution did not mean that when Muslims put forward their demand, it must be accepted at once.... It is a big struggle and continued struggle. The first struggle was to get the representative character of the League accepted. That fight they had started and they had won. Acceptance of the Mission's proposal was not the end of their struggle for Pakistan. They

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1 A.G.Noorani, "The Cabinet Mission and its Aftermath", The Partition of India : Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947, ed. C.H.Phillips, p.116.

should continue their struggle till Pakistan was achieved.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, it was clear that the League would not have worked, in any case, for the goal of preserving the unity of India.

Mountbatten verbally suggested Azad that if Gandhi's proposal of making Jinnah sole incharge of the Interim government had been accepted by the Congress, the partition of India might have been avoided. But we feel that it was also not a workable solution of the problem, as Jinnah did not pay any heed to Gandhi's suggestion. On the other hand, the League joined the Interim government, not to co-operate, but to sabotage it in order to safeguard the Muslim League's 'Direct action' to achieve the objective of Pakistan. Moreover, seeing Jinnah's dominating political behaviour, one may infer that he would have never accepted the position of number two in any organisation of government. It is evident from the fact that when Mountbatten went to Karachi to inaugurate the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and insisted to speak as Governor-General, Jinnah allowed him to do so very reluctantly. This proves that he was not ready to play a second fiddle even at a brief, formal meeting. When such was the basic nature and mentality of Jinnah, it was impossible for him to agree with Gandhi's proposal.

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1 Quoted in Indian Annual Register, Vol. I (Jan-Feb., 1946), p.181.

However, all these hypotheses are just hypotheses, for the partition was inevitable. The parties involved in the problem were : (i) the British government, (ii) the Congress, and (iii) the permanent president of the Muslim League, Jinnah; and all the three parties, though in varied degrees, were responsible for the partition of India. The alien rulers ruled over India with the simple political tactics of 'divide and rule' from the beginning to the end of their reign. The Britishers were not capable enough to continue their hold on India after World War II due to many changes in the domestic politics and the external environment. Hence the British government decided to divide India and quit her in their own interests. In this connection, Maulana Azad wrote :

If a United India had become free according to the Cabinet Mission Plan, there was little chance that Britain could retain her position in the Economic and industrial life of India. The partition of India in which the Muslim majority provinces formed a separate and independent state would, on the other hand, give Britain a foothold in India. A state dominated by the Muslim League would offer a permanent sphere of influence to the British — with a British base in Pakistan, India would have to pay far greater attention to the British interests than she might otherwise do.<sup>1</sup>

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1 M.A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, pp.191-92.

The Congress, too, cannot escape the charge of dividing India. It is responsible, to a considerable extent, for the vivisection of the country. Lacking in foresight and imagination, it committed many serious mistakes. The Congress leaders welcomed annulment of the partition of Bengal and accepted the separation of Bihar and Assam from Bengal without understanding the implications of it. This converted Bengal into a Muslim majority province. The Congress accepted the Morley-Minto scheme of separate electorate at the Lucknow Pact of 1916, and worked throughout the national movement for provincial autonomy and weak centre. The Congress continuously propagated the principle of self-determination. Also, it accepted the bifurcation of Bombay province in 1932, which made Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier province as predominantly Muslim areas. In the same year, it recognised the communal award as Poona Pact. The story of the follies of the Congress leaders did not end there only. Nehru rejected the League proposal to form the coalition ministry after the elections were over under the provisions of the Act of 1935. The consequences of this were very injurious to the cause of national unity. This was followed by the 'Day of Deliverance', observed by the Muslim League when the Congress ministries resigned as a protest against the Viceroy's decision of joining World War II. Again, Gandhiji

agreed to 'Rajaji formula' in his conversation with Jinnah in September, 1944. Then the Congress failed to translate the Cabinet Mission Plan into practice. The Congress President, Nehru, committed another mistake on July 10, 1946 by asserting that the Congress had every authority to modify the plan to meet the exigencies of the situation. It was owing to this that the Muslim League withdrew its approval of the Cabinet Mission Plan and resorted to 'Direct Action' which was a clear prelude to the partition.

The Muslim League under the guidance of its clever leader, Jinnah, was the greatest cause of the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah alone played the most decisive role and led the League to the victory of getting a nation. He was uncompromising and unmanageable. At the annual session of the League in 1938, he remarked that although few Muslims in the past had seriously thought about the Muslims' interests, but their contributions must be acknowledged gratefully. Though the early leaders of the League rightly thought that the Muslim interests could be promoted only through an alliance with the British imperialism, yet they could not materialize their dreams. Further, he declared :

I say the Muslim League is not going to be an ally of any one, but would be the ally of even the devil if need be in the interests of Muslims.... It is not because we are in love with imperialism;

but in politics one has to play one's game as on the chess-board.<sup>1</sup>

Jinnah was ambitious, dogmatic, confident, clever and domineering. He had complete faith and confidence in his own ability and judgment; he never thought that he might be wrong on any point. It is reported that he once said to his political opponents : "You try to find out what will please people and you then act accordingly. My way of action is quite different. I first decide what is right and I do it. The people come around me and the opposition vanishes."<sup>2</sup> His other tactic was to be rude deliberately to score a point and to get better considerations for his views and demands. Giving his estimate of Jinnah to Mountbatten, Nehru observed that the secret of his success, which had been tremendous from all points of view, was in his capacity to resort to a permanently negative attitude.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps, the reason of Jinnah's negative attitude was his failure in personal life. He was in love with a Parsi girl who was younger to him by twenty years. He married her in the face of opposition from his parents. The lady died in 1929, and at that time she had already got herself separated from

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1 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, p.78.

2 Ibid., p.87.

3 Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, p.44.

him. Again, in 1928 he miserably failed to secure any support for his views at the All Parties Convention. He pleaded before the Conference :

That the Muslims would be given one third representation, in the Central legislature and that 'residuary powers' would be vested in the provinces.<sup>1</sup>

The proposals were rejected. The Congress leaders even questioned Jinnah's bonafide for speaking on behalf of the Muslims of India. It is reported that Jinnah took this to heart. He had tears in his eyes as he said : "Jamshed, this is the parting of the ways."<sup>2</sup> At this time, Jinnah greatly suffered from humiliation. Not only this, he estimated himself very low, and was in a state of utter hopelessness, which he described as follows :

At that time there was no pride in me and I used to beg from the Congress.... I began to feel that neither could I help India, nor change the Hindu mentality, nor could I make the Musalmans realize their precarious position. I felt so disappointed and so depressed that I decided to settle down in London. Not that I did not love India; but I felt utterly helpless. I kept in touch with India. At the end of four years I found that the Musalmans were in greatest danger. I made up my mind to come back to India,

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1 Quoted by H. Bolitho in Jinnah Creator of Pakistan (London : John Murray, 1954), p.95.

2 Ibid.

as I could not do any good from London. Having no sanction behind me I was in the position of a beggar and received the treatment that a beggar deserved.<sup>1</sup>

Even in 1934 when he was offered the Presidentship of the League, he was in the double mind with regard to his return to India. He returned to India at the end of 1935 to organise the Muslim League for the forthcoming provincial elections, and this was the turning point in his political career. The first phase was over in which he pleaded for the national reconciliation and adjustment between the two communities. In the years to come he played a major part in Indian politics, specially between 1937 and 1947. He dominated the League: as a matter of fact, to all events and purposes, he was the very incarnation of this organisation.<sup>2</sup> He had overcome his deficiencies, such as his inability to speak fluently in Urdu, etc., and established himself as the sole leader of the Muslim India. As a cunning demagogue, he would play with the emotions and sentiments of the Muslim masses, and moved them step by step towards the realization of their goal. He fully knew the Muslim fear-psychology, described accurately by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in the following words :

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1 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah pp.38-9.

2 K.B.Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase, II, pp.204-05.

As a community, the Moslems were extremely anxious about their future. It is true that they were in a clear majority in certain provinces. At the provincial level they had therefore no fears in these areas. They were, however, a minority in India as a whole and were troubled by the fear that their position and status in independent India would not be secure.<sup>1</sup>

Jinnah exploited this situation — viz. the Muslim fear of the Hindu domination over them — to the maximum.

But a pussant force behind Jinnah's unbending and uncompromising attitudes and activities was his personal ambition. In his book, Power and Personality, Harold D.Lasswell points out the basic psychological reasons which drive great men to strive for power. He says :

Our key hypothesis about the power seeker is that he pursues power as a means of compensation against deprivation. Power is expected to overcome the low estimate of the self by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it functions.<sup>2</sup>

He cites many cases to prove that a severe deprivation relatively late in life leads a man to furious concentration upon power. Jinnah's hard-headed realism in politics, his early life and influence of parents, his education, his failure in

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1 M.A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.98.

2 Harold D.Lasswell, Power and Personality (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1960), p.32.

married life, his desires and ambitions, etc. — all these testify the hypothesis propounded by Lasswell. This brilliant author also discusses how such leaders change their private motives into public purposes, as Mr. Jinnah did. Lasswell reduces it to a formula which is as follows :  $P \xrightarrow{d} G \xrightarrow{r} P$ . In this formula, P stands for private motives; d for displacement of private motives by a public object; r for rationalization in terms of public interest; P for the political man; and G for the transformation of private motives into public purposes.<sup>1</sup> In this way, the personal ambition of Jinnah to become the first among the Muslims was the primary motive behind his fierce struggle for the creation of Pakistan. Thus, at the root of Jinnah's political activities was his ambition. Khalid B. Sayeed correctly thinks that "his political rejection and failures in his personal life, coincided with the needs of the Muslim community. The Muslims needed a leader, and Jinnah needed an instrument with which to achieve his aims and to restore his self-confidence."<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, this was not possible for him to do in the undivided India.

Jinnah used religion as the main weapon of his political strategy. He did not much bother about the new political

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1 Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, pp.75—6.

2 K.B. Sayeed, ed., Pakistan, The Formative Phase, II, pp.289-94.

concepts and modern economics of the state. The Muslim League failed in the first round of elections, held under the provisions of the Act of 1935. Jinnah was in dilemma at this juncture. In the second round of by-elections, he raised the slogan, 'Islam is in danger', which led the League to unexpected victory. He exploited the religious sentiments of the people, and appealed to the Muslims in the name of Allah and the holy Qoran to support the Muslim League candidates. He treated himself as the sole representative of the Indian Muslims. Thus, he made the League anti-Hindu, anti-Congress and anti-national. He treated the Congress as a Hindu organisation only, and created a phobia of the Hindu Raj in the minds of the Muslims. This worked as a electric current throughout India and made him the undisputed, uncrowned leader of the Muslim masses. Gandhi's opposition to his concept of 'Two nations' further strengthened Jinnah's slogan, 'Islam is in danger'. To save Islam, he resorted to the reign of terror, chaos, and murders. He never missed an opportunity for a message on Islamic holidays. He emphasized the pride and self-respect of the Muslims, and recalled the days of the great Muguls. He stressed the rich heritage of the Islamic culture and its superiority over others. He created a religious dichotomy in the Indian politics. All this helped him much in gaining the British support for the Muslims from time to time, and in keeping the Muslims aloof from the 'Quit India movement'.

He also tactfully demonstrated that the Congress did not represent the Muslims of India; it only represented those who had themselves joined the Congress organisation.

Jinnah knew that 'Islam is in danger' was the only device by which he could realise his dream of Pakistan. The Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S. were also responsible for introducing religion into Indian politics. The concept of Hindu supremacy in religion and culture was also the cause of the Hindu-Muslim antagonism. Gandhi was also responsible for causing the rift between the Hindus and the Muslims by using Hindu symbols and values against the British imperialism just to promote the cause of national freedom. In this connection Panderel Moon observes :

This Hinduising of the national movement, which Gandhiji's leadership promoted and symbolised, was injurious and ultimately fatal to Hindu-Muslim unity. But Gandhi failed to see the danger. Conscious only of his own goodwill towards the Muslims he was obstinately blind to the averse effects on Muslim opinion of his own pronounced Hinduism. His basic concepts, his moral values and ideals, even his fads and foibles, were of Hindu origin. In his writings and speeches he constantly employed language, imagery and symbolism undisguisedly derived from Hindu sources; and he often appeared to evince as much interest in the reform of Hinduism as in the attainment of independence and indeed more or less to equate them.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Panderel Moon, Gandhi and Modern India (London : English Universities Press, 1962), p.276.

Thus, Gandhi's religious approach to Indian national movement made Jinnah, to a great extent, a militant Muslim to fight vigorously for a separate Muslim nation. Apropos of this, Gunnar remarks : "Gan hi more than anyone else helped to transform Jinnah from a keen Indian nationalist into the architect of Pakistan."<sup>1</sup>

In view of this deep-rooted antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims, the creation of Pakistan can also be attributed to the fundamental differences between these two communities. They widely differ in culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, laws and jurisprudence, social and moral codes, customs and calender, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, outlook on life, mentality, etc. They are entirely different societies, and in many respects antagonistic to each other. Thus in the end, it can be concluded that the cultural conflict of the Hindus and the Muslims and Jinnah's ambitions, uncompromising leadership created Pakistan, the second largest Islamic state of the world.

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1 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama : An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, I (New York : Pantheon, 1968), pp.236-37.