

S E C T I O N - I V

Critical Studies of Contributory Factors

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POWER : DISPARITY BETWEEN DEMAND AND SUPPLY AFFECTED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Among the contributory factors for the declining trends of some of the basic industries of the State, power or electricity is definitely one of the factors worth mentioning. There was practically no power problem in the 50s. Power problem in the state appeared in the 60s and more acutely from the first half of 70s. The problem lingered even beyond the period of 1985-86. Giant three Thermal Power stations were established by the State Electricity Board after independence at Bandel (1965), Sandaldih (1973) and Kolaghat (1983). DVC Power project was also taken up by the joint ventures of the state government of West Bengal, Bihar and the Central Government. NTPC^(a) established one giant plant at Farakka.

But before coming up all these giant power stations, power crisis was discernible in the state from the beginningⁿ of 1961 when a series of breakdowns in power plants of Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation and Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) had crippled power supply in the greater Calcutta area. Industries were asked to observe austerity in power consumption and some kind of rationing system was introduced for domestic consumers. At that time the centre and the State Governments came forward to rescue the state from power famine, and the Central Government appointed Sachdeva Committee to suggest ways for stepping up generation during the Third Plan period, and^{it} recommended installation of a 100 - MW power station near Calcutta for supply of power to industries and one 75 MW unit at Durgapur projects, a 15 MW unit at Gouripur, one 50 MW unit at Cossipur. All recommendations were accepted excepting the Gouripur project. With the commissioning of all these projects power situation improved; but with the increase of demand disparity between demand and supply was again a problem. But the planners and also the State Government could not^e tell this discrepancy. The USA agreed to install a 140 - MW set at Durgapur, but it was ignored during the Third Plan . The proposal for setting up a 1000-MW

(a) NTPC = National Thermal Power Corporation

unit at Santaldih was drastically slashed to 480 MW.

The Central Water and Power Commission submitted a memorandum to the centre in the second half of 60s where it was warned that a 'black out' was imminent. It was pointed out that a short fall of 120 MW in West Bengal would be in 1970-71, and it would increase to 200 MW in 1973; but the warning went unheeded and the allocation of Rs.93.42 crore for various projects of West Bengal State Electricity Board was reduced to Rs.69 crore¹.

Table - 9.1 A

Installed Capacity of Electricity in West Bengal from 1951-1986
(In MW)

Year	West Bengal	Maharashtra	All India
1951	546	339	1835
1961	754	759	4653
1966	1067	1305	9027
1972	1216	2109	15254
1976	1639	2480	24039
1979	1740	2962	28940
1980-81*	1945	-	-
1985-86*	3278	-	-

Source : Draft Five Year Plan 1978-83 for Maharashtra

In Table 9.1A, the production of electricity in West Bengal and a comparison with Maharashtra has been shown. It may be noted that in 1951 production in W.Bengal far exceeded that of Maharashtra, but thereafter production in Maharashtra far exceeded that of W.Bengal. From 1951 to 1979, production in W.Bengal increased by 3 times and the increase in Maharashtra

* Economic Review, Govt. of W.Bengal, 1986-87, year ends at 31 March

1. Supplement on Power in West Bengal published by the Statesman on Sept.9, 1980

was 8.73 times and the all India generation went up by 15.77 times.

The power famine actually began in this state from 60s and continued upto 1985-86, the period of consideration. But the crisis lingered even beyond that period.

The power crisis for a long period of 25 years was surprising and it affected industrial development. Power shortage is a perennial problem and none can say when the crisis would be over in West Bengal.

The power projects were behind scheduled in all the cases and they could not cope with the ever increasing demand. The commissioning of the projects was unnecessarily delayed.

Table - 9.1

Projects and Date of sanction and Date of Commission

Projects	Date of sanction	Date of commission
1. 5th unit of Bandel(210 MW)	Aug. 1972	Nov. 1980
2. Three units of 210 MW each at Kolaghat	Jan. 1972	1982-83
3. 4th unit of 120 MW at Santaldih	1972	1980-81
4. CESC's 240 MW power station at Titagarh	1975	1983-84

Source : The Statesman Supplement on Power Sept 9, 1980

The dates of commission of different units were changed a number of times. Although the giant 5th unit at Bendel was sanctioned in 1972 it was commissioned in 1980. That is, it went beyond the scheduled date. The Kolaghat units took 11 years for commissioning. Santaldih's 4th unit took 9 years to complete. CESC's 240 MW unit was also commissioned after 9 years. Usually a power plant is completed within 5 years. But delay in commissioning the plants was unusual. It affected the state in two ways : (1) It increased

cost, (2) It delayed supply of electricity, i.e., it could not meet up demand as was expected.

Table - 9.2

West Bengal's Peak Demand outside the DVC area

Year (1)	Unrestricted demand MW (2)	Restricted demand MW(3)	Supply MW(4)	Shortfall MW(5)
1978-79	1,419	1,206	1,040	379
1983-84	2,213	1,830	1,382	831
1984-85	2,407	2,045	1,438	969
1985-86	2,620	2,223	1,431	1,189

Source : The supplement on power (Statesman Sept 9, 1980)

The table 9.2 shows that there are discrepancies between supply and demand and shortfall increased from 379 MW in 1978-79 to 1,189 MW in 1985-86. During this 7 years from 1978 to 1985 demand increased by 84 per cent while supply went up by only 37 per cent.

Production of power in terms of percentage increased only 112 per cent in W.Bengal from 1951 to 1971 (20 years) against 1074 per cent in the Punjab, 1171 per cent in Tamil Nadu, 575 per cent in U.P., 539 per cent in Gujarat and 525 per cent in Maharashtra².

Table - 9.3

Increase of Production from 1951 to 1971 (in percentage)

States	Increase in %
Tamil Nādu	1171
Punjab	1074
U. P.	575
Gujarat	539
Maharashtra	525
West Bengal	112

Source : Govt. of West Bengal (Jubamanas Sept-Oct, 1980)

2. Jubamanas Sept-Oct, 1980 (Govt. of West Bengal), PP 18

Table 9.2 shows that suppressed demand (difference between col 2 & col 3) in 1978-79 was 213 MW, 617 MW in 1983-84, 362 MW in 1984-85, 397 MW in 1985-86.

The Left Front came to the Government in 1977 when loadshedding was very much intensive, and they purchased gas turbines from U.K. to get rid of the power crisis within a short span of time. They purchased 5 gas turbines in 1979-80 which generated 100 MW³. But this is run by diesel and therefore costly.

The Left Front Govt. in the same Journal (Jubamanas) said that they inherited a deficit of 355 MW. In June 1977, total demand was 1005 MW and total supply was 650 MW (1005 - 650 = 355). But at that time total capacity of power plants was more than 1,400 MW, i.e., capacity utilisation was 45 per cent⁴.

Table 9.4

The Left Front took the following projects between 1977 and 1985-86

Year	Projects	Unit	Capacity MW	Total Production (MW)
1978-79	i) Santaldih	3rd	120	122
	ii) Richinton		2	
1979-80	Gas Tarbine	5	100	100
1980-81	i) Santaldih	4th	120	330
	ii) Bandel	5th	210	
1981-82	i) Durgapur		110	118
	ii) Jaidheka		8	
1982-83	i) Kolaghat	1st & 2nd	420	612.5
	ii) Titagarh	3	180	
	iii) Rammam	1	12.5	
1983-84	i) Kolaghat	3rd	210	495
	ii) Titagarh	4th	60	
	iii) Rammam	2	25	
	iv) Farraka	1	200	
		21 units	GRAND TOTAL :	1,777.5

3. Jubamanas (Govt.of West Bengal) Sept-Oct, 1980 Annual Number PP 21

4. Article by Shyamal Chakraborty, Minister of West Bengal published in the Festival Number of Jubamanas (Govt.of West Bengal).

But the problem is : the projects were inordinately delayed mainly for two reasons : i) Lack of fund, i.e., the fund was not released in time, ii) labour indiscipline. The projects were implemented by private contractors. The labourers apprehended loss of work after the completion of the projects. Therefore, they adopted go-slow policy and sometimes ceased work for months.

Poor supervision, unskilled labour force recruited locally etc. brought down the percentage of capacity utilisation which varied between 30 and 40 per cent. On several occasions complete 'black out' in the state, especially in the South Bengal was experienced.

The power famine for nearly three decades was responsible for the slow growth rate in production in industry and agriculture. The industrial units had to pay full wage even during loadshedding which in some years lasted for 10 to 12 hours (day & night). The industrial units had to declare 'lay-off' for want of power. Captive Power plants were not allowed to production units in many cases on the plea that State Electricity Board ^{would} face marketing problem. On the same reason, the CESC was not allowed to expand their units for a long period of time. When the problem was out of gear, the Govt. decided to give permission to CESC for the expansion of old plants and also setting up new plants at say Titagarh, Budge Budge.

Being an industrially developed state the power shortage has affected the economic life of the people of West Bengal. The state produces 21 per cent of the total industrial production of the country, and 9 per cent of the GNP. West Bengal, especially Calcutta and its urban areas, may be called a Mini-India, for people from almost all parts of the country live here. Hence, impacts of power crisis in West Bengal are extended all over the country.

Power shortage was not a new problem in this state. The state was confronted with the problem for the last decades. The shortfall in the Calcutta area along was between 100MW ^{and} 175 MW almost daily⁵. In some parts of Calcutta Metropolitan area power-cut continued eight to ten hours a day. Industries were not assured of regular supply of electricity. Load-shedding, even in the densely populated areas, was a regular feature. Jute, engineering, small-scale industries, printing presses were substantially affected for the shortage of power. New industries were not coming up for want of power. The State Government could not guarantee undisturbed power supply. New enterprises could not afford to bear the production loss owing to non-availability of power. In an unofficial estimate, during 1980-81 the production loss due to power failure was of Rs.1,000 crore in this state. Production cost had increased to a considerable extent because average fixed cost had gone up as a result of low level of production.

The agriculture was also hard hit for non-supply of power in rural areas. Rural electrification programme in the state had practically been shelved for want of power. In rural electrification programme the whole of eastern region was lagging behind other regions. In West Bengal only 31 per cent of the villages has been electrified. This percentage in other states till 1978 was : Haryana and Rajasthan - 100, Tamil Nadu - 99, Kerala - 97, Maharashtra and Jammu & Kashmir - 62, Karnataka - 58, Mndhra Pradesh - 55.

West Bengal's total installed power generating capacity was 1945 MW in 1981-82. The details are given in Table 9.6

5. Power Department, Govt. of West Bengal regularly despatched the amount of daily shortfall. The figures were despatched to the press by Power Deptt. in June 1980.

Table - 9.5

Region-wise growth of Installed Capacity

(in MW)

Region	1951	1961	1973	1980	% increase from 1951 to 1980
Eastern	599	1241	3654	4535	750
Northern	354	908	4075	7907	2300
Western	422	1359	4069	7318	1800
Southern	363	1115	4517	6897	1900

Source : Finance Ministry & C E A

Table - 9.6

Power Projects in West Bengal
(1981-82)

(in MW)

Projects	Installed Capacity
Bandel (SEB)	330
Durgapur (DVC)	290
Santalidih (SEB)	360
Calcutta Electric Supply Co. (Private)	413
Durgapur Project Ltd. (autonomous body)	285
Gouripore (SEB)	35
Jaidhaka (SEB)	27 (H)
Dishergarh (SEB)	15
Massanjore (SEB)	4 (H)
Mayurakshi (SEB)	4 (H)
Little Ranjit (SEB)	2 (H)
Four Gas Turbines (SEB)	80

Total : 1,845

SEB = State Electricity Board, H = Hydro

Table - 9.7

Projection of Demand for Power in West Bengal

(in MW)

Year	Total Demand	Increase in demand from previous year
1977-78	1005	x
1978-79	1185	180
1979-80	1340	155
1980-81	1460	120
1981-82	1569	109
1982-83	1715	146
1983-84	1940	225
1984-85	2400	460
1985-86	2700	300

Source : Jubamanas, Sept-Oct 1980 published by Govt.of W.Bengal

Table - 9.8

Capacity Utilisation in Power Projects in West Bengal

Year	Capacity utilisation (%)
1970-71	38.4
1971-72	38.0
1972-73	41.3
1973-74	38.4
1974-75	38.3
1979-80*	39.2

* This is according to State Government's report.

Table - 9.9

Per Capita Consumption in Different States

States	(in KWH)		
	1960-61	1970-71	1977-78
Punjab	33	159	242
Maharashtra	73	158	199
Gujarat	52	138	192
Haryana	-	98	174
Karnataka	44	104	148
Tamil Nadu	50	130	146
West Bengal	84	116	125
Orissa	-	-	89
Assam	-	-	34
All India	-	-	178

Source : Govt. of West Bengal

Thermal power plants predominate in West Bengal. The total installed capacity in hydro projects was only 37^{MW} (1985).

With the increase of population, expansion of industries, modernisation of agriculture the demand for power had been continuously increasing day by day. The nature of demand increase is shown in Table 9.7.

If we consider the year 1981-82 and analyse the supply and demand situation, we shall see that in this year the installed capacity was 1,845 MW and demand 1,569 MW⁶. Naturally there was no reason of worry. But the problem was that the actual supply was far less than the installed capacity of the power projects. The actual generation of power in power stations in West Bengal varied between 30 and 40 per cent of the installed capacity on the average. Hence, there was a huge gap between supply and demand. According to the report (1974-75) of the Controller and Auditor General of India, the capacity utilis-

tion in West Bengal's power projects was as shown in Table 9.8.

In case of break-down of a unit or units, which was very frequent, power supply failed sharply causing black-out in vast areas. The actual supply of power in the state ranged between 550 and 700 MW, and therefore in mathematical calculation shortage varied from 869 to 1,019 MW daily.

The per capita power consumption in West Bengal had fallen compared to that of other states. In 1960-61, the per capita power consumption in this state was the highest. In 1970-71 West Bengal's position was fifth and in 1977-78 the position came down to seventh (Table - 9.9).

Table 9.9 also shows that per capita electricity consumption in four eastern states (W.B., Bihar, Orissa and Assam) is far below the national average.

Regional Backwardness

Eastern region, especially West Bengal, from the economic point of view holds a very important position in the country. About 25 per cent of the total population live in this region and 30 per cent of the GNP is contributed by this part of the country. Major exportable items like jute goods, tea, engineering goods, are predominantly produced in this region. Among the eastern States, West Bengal and Bihar are industrially developed. Though eastern region is rich in coal and mineral oil, it faces serious energy crisis which has paralysed, so to say, the economic life of the people. All the eastern States put together consume less than 15 per cent of the nation's power supply which is significantly less than that consumed by a single Western State, Maharashtra, which takes away a 18 per cent slice. Since 1951, the installed capacity of power production in the eastern sector has increased by only 7 times, while it has multiplied 23, 18 and 19 times in the northern, western and southern regions respectively. Power being the pivotal to economic growth, it is only natural that in other spheres too the eastern region is rapidly

falling behind the other parts of the country. In 1951 the installed power capacity in the eastern region was 599 MW, the highest in all regions, but in 1980 eastern region's position came down to the bottom⁷. The deteriorating position of the eastern sector is shown in Table 9.5.

Among the eastern states West Bengal and Bihar predominate. About 70 per cent of the total population of this region live in West Bengal (54.5 million) and Bihar (70 million) (1981). These two states share more than 83 per cent of the installed power generating capacity of the eastern sector. West Bengal's installed capacity is about 40 per cent of the total capacity of the eastern region. But among the eastern states West Bengal and Bihar are confronted with acute power crisis. Power crisis in other eastern states is not so serious.

Causes of the Crisis

Now the question is why has it been so? There are several reasons for the state of affairs in West Bengal :

1. Increasing demand of power was never taken into account by the rulers of the State. Lack of foresight on the part of the concerned authorities is responsible for this failure in the power front. As a result, supply could not catch up demand.

2. The machines of the existing power plants are obsolete. The average longevity of the machines is 20 years and all the plants are older than that period. Besides, the machines are not given any rest according to usual rule. During emergency in 1975 there was heavy pressure on the machines and they were used in excess of their capacity. Periodical overhauls of the machines were never done before. Overhauling means stoppage of production, so it was avoided. As a result of this there is continuous tube leakages and break-downs of the units.

3. Labour indiscipline, theft, inter-union rivalry, loose administration

are to a great extent responsible for the low production in power plants. In a power plant in West Bengal there are 17 unions and they quarrel all the time. The capacity utilisation of the plant is below 20 per cent. Even when the whole of the state was power hungry and there was incessant load-sheddings, the unions called for 'cease work' for higher wage and other benefits. Sense of responsibility among the workers is totally absent. Workers do not complete their usual work only to get overtime benefit. For example, a staff in a plant whose monthly salary was Rs.500, drew Rs.3,000 in a month as overtime allowance⁸. The cost of production in power plants has been swelling up owing to inefficiency and corruption and the burden is shifted to the shoulder of the consumers. The Government is a silent spectator, for they cannot cope with the militant trade unionism.

4. Skilled labour, efficient technicians and engineers, honest officers are lacking in power projects. At one time 10,000 unskilled workers were recruited by the State Electricity Board only to provide employment to party cadres of a particular political party and these workers created problems there. There is no arrangement for training to the workers. They work without having any knowledge about the functioning of power plants. This is also a vital cause of low production.

5. The on-going projects are taking too much time in completing the plants and making ready for production. For example, the Kolaghat project has already taken ten years, yet no body can say when the project be fully completed. If some of the on-going projects would have been commissioned as scheduled, the power problem would not have turned into such a sorry state. Additional units, at the existing plants at Bandel (5th unit) and Santaldih (4th unit) were scheduled to start generation of power in October 1980; but for various reasons the commission had been delayed. Here also administrative lapse, labour indiscipline, non-co-operation from the Central Government are

8. Bandel Thermal Power Station of State Electricity Board.

responsible for inordinate delay. Timely commission of the two additional units in Santaldih and Bondel could have increased supply by 262MW (if capacity utilisation would have been 80 per cent).

6. Transmission loss is as high as 20 per cent⁹. This is above normal. Saving of transmission loss by say 10 per cent could have substantially improved power position.

7. After nationalisation of coal mines rampant corruption has gripped the whole business. Supply of coal has been very irregular to the power stations. Higher percentage of ash content in coal supplied to plants has damaged the boilers causing frequent tube leakages and break-downs.

Prospects

Several measures have been taken by the Government to cope with the power crises. But power shortage is such a problem which cannot be solved overnight. There is long gestation period between planning, starting of work and generation of power. The problem is so acute that some short term measures be immediately taken to get rid of the plight of the people owing to shortfall of supply.

If all the schemes ^{would have} run on the right track, it was expected that by 1985 an additional 2,522 MW ^{would} be available in the state. The measures, (both short and long term) which have been taken so far are as follows :-

(A) Short term measures : (i) Five gas turbines have been imported by State Government from U.K.. Each turbine has the generation capacity of 20 MW.

(ii) Some of the units in power plants are overhauled and these units are producing more electricity now.

(B) Long term measures : (i) The scheme of Kolaghat has been revived. At first it was decided that three units with the capacity of 210 MW each would

be set up. Later on it has been planned that another three units with the capacity of 210 MW each will be established at Kolaghat. It means after completion of total installed capacity at Kolaghat thermal power station Production will be 1,260 MW.

(ii) One additional unit (fourth unit) is being added to Santaldih (Purulia) thermal power station. The unit's installed capacity is 120 MW.

(iii) At Bandel (Hooghly) an extra unit (fifth unit) has been constructed.

(iv) The Calcutta Electric Supply Company's long standing demand has been conceded and the company is permitted to construct four units (4 x 60 - 240 MW) at Titagarh (24-Parganas) near Calcutta. As this is under private sector, the progress of work is satisfactory.

(v) NTPC (National Thermal Power Corporation) has a plan to construct a superthermal power station at Farakka with a capacity of 2000 MW.

(vi) The Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) has begun work to build a thermal power station at Durgapur with a capacity of 200 MW.

(vii) The State Government has chalked out a plan to set up a thermal power station in North Bengal. This plant will have four units and will produce 2400 MW (4 x 60 = 240 MW).

(viii) The West Bengal State Electricity Board (WBSEB) is toying with the idea of setting up a super thermal power station of, 2000 MW capacity at Rajmohal in Murshidabad.

(ix) A few small hydro electricity projects are being executed by WBSEB.

Now, from Tables 9.6 and 9.10 we understand that the total installed capacity in West Bengal will be 4,367 KW (1845 MW + 2522 MW) by 1985 and

that

the total demand by that time will go up to 2400 MW (Table 9.7). Hence, it was expected that power crisis in West Bengal *would* be over by 1985 and probably power *would* be surplus. But that did not happen. From our past experience we can say that despite having so many projects under execution there is hardly any chance for the solution of power problem in the State. There are two reasons for that, First, it is unlikely that projects under execution will be completed as scheduled. The progress of work is very slow. Inter-union rivalry has already started even in projects under execution. The State Electricity Board or the State Government does not taken disciplinary action against corrupt and indisciplined employees. Initiatives are absent among the officers. Excepting the Titagarh project which is under GESC, in private sector, not a single unit is likely to be commissioned within the stipulated date. Secondly, there is wide gap between installed capacity and actual output. The capacity utilisation in the existing projects, as has been said earlier, varies between 30 and 40 per cent. If we get 40 per cent power of the installed capacity of 4,367 MW in 1985, then total generation will be 1,747 MW against projected demand of 2,400 MW. This is calculated on the basis of the assumption that all the projects under execution will begin generation on specified dates. But it is almost sure that projects under execution will not be completed as expected. Hence, the chance for the solution of power crisis is very remote.

A Few Suggestions :

(1) Admitting that there is long gestation period between laying down of foundation stone of a power plant and its commission, power production both in West Bengal and Bihar can be increased by 30 to 40 per cent immediately if strict discipline is maintained in the power plants. D.V.C. Chairman Mr. P.C.Luthar's strong action against unions augmented production in DVC plants by 50 per cent. This proved that indiscipline among the employees was responsible to a considerable extent for low output in power plants.

(2) Attempt should be made to finish the on-going projects according to scheduled dates. This is very important.

(3) In West Bengal there is practically no hydro electricity. The installed capacity of the hydro-projects in West Bengal is not more than 2 per cent of the total installed capacity against 30 to 40 per cent in many states. Water resources of North and South Bengal can be utilised for power generation. Experts have suggested that in West Bengal there is ample opportunity of hydro-power. They have said that at least 1,800 MW electricity could be generated if water resources were tapped.

(4) Big power plants have some disadvantages. First of all, the initial cost of installation is too much. Secondly, it is very difficult to manage them. Thirdly, break-downs in such plants mean huge shortage of power. Hence, small power plants with installed capacities 80 to 120 MW be established in different places scattered throughout the state. In such a case complete break-down or labour indiscipline in one plant will not affect vast areas.

(5) At least one atomic power plant be set up in the eastern region.

(6) The proposed inter-state circuit system be translated into action, so that, surplus power in one State can be transmitted to a deficit State.

(7) Administration of the State Electricity Board must be geared up.

Conclusions

We may conclude that power crisis was one of the main contributory factors for the declining ^{or slower growth} trends in industries in West Bengal. The crisis continued for decades. Production loss in industries was insurmountable. As there was no hope for the solution of the problem in near future capital flew from the State. The Hindustan Motors opened their new units in Madras

Table - 9.10

Projects Under Execution in West Bengal

Location	Capacity (MW)	Expected date of completion
Kolaghat (SEB) (Phase I)	630	1982-83
Kolaghat (SEB) (Phase II)	630	1984-85
Santaldih(SEB)	120	October,1980
Bandel (SEB)	210	October,1980
Titagarh (CESC)	240	1983-84
North Bengal (SEB)	240	1984-85
Durgapur (DVC)	200	1982-83
Farakka (NIPC)	200	1985
Jaldhaka (SEB)	8	1981-82
Rammam (SEB)	24	1983-84
Siliguri (SEB)	20	1984-85
Total :		2522

Source : State Electricity Board, Govt. of West Bengal.

and Gujarat without expanding their unit at Uttarpara (West Bengal). Bata and Dunlop also shifted capital from the state. Other examples of such capital flight were also noticed. Frequent break-down of power plants, production far below the capacity, high percentage (20%) of transmission loss etc. were responsible for power famine. New investors was afraid of power shortage in this state. Entrepreneurs from other states avoided West Bengal; for the state Government could not guarantee power supply. Increasing demand for power could not be met even during last 25 years from 1960 to 1985. Large number of industrial units became sick. From 1950-51 to 1960-61 power supply was steady. The State Government could not foresee the demand in future years and they could hardly improve capacity utilisation.

Poor maintenance of power plants, labour unrest, shortage of fund etc. were the main causes for the short production of electricity in West Bengal.

Although there was potentiality in the production of hydro-electricity, the State Government could not use the potentiality. Nobody knows when the power famine will be over in West Bengal.